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NATION BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN EMERGENT AFRICAN NATIONS*
S. K. B. Asante**

I
SOURCES AND MANIFESTATIONS
The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed the
emergence of some thirty new nations in Africa.

Independence

evoked sanguine expectations; it meant the end of alien rule, but
the vast majority of Africans also saw in nationhood the promise
of firm human rights guarantees.

National independence was in

fact identified with individual liberty.
cation surprising.

Nor was this identifi-

African nationalist movements after all

flourished in a world which had emerged from Nazism and Fascism-a world which had proclaimed a new order imbued with a profound
concern for human rights.

The struggle for self-determination

was itself regarded as an aspect of this human rights movement,
and nationalist leaders freely invoked affirmations of human
rights in international as well as national thinking.
Internationallythree factors were basic in creating a
favorable atmosphere for human rights:

first, the United Nations

Charter, which devotes six articles to "encouraging" or "promoting"
respect for human rights.

Second, the adoption by the UN of-the

Universal Declaration of human rights in 1948.

This Declaration

has become an international_yardsticqk for determining the content
of human rights and has been a powerful source of inspiration for
the founding pattern of African nations.

Third, there is the

European Convention of Human Rights which translated human rights
into precise legal rights and has directly influenced the framing
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of the constitutions of several African nations, such as Nigeria
and Sierra Leone.
The impact of these international factors on the development
of African human rights principles was, needless to say, reinforced
by the political and constitutional ideas of the metropolitan powers
formerly in Africa and of other western nations. The human rights
provisions of the constitutions of French-speaking African countries are directly traceable to the French Declaration of Rights in
1789, as restated in the French Constitutions of 1946 and 1958.
Africans familiar with Anglo-American history are fully conversant
with the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, the American
Declaration of Independence and, of course, the Bill of Rights of
the American Constitution. The British may not have a written
constitution with a justiciable Bill of Rights, but those of us
who have been exposed to British institutions are assured that
fundamental rights are located in the interstices of the ordinary
law of the land. In any case the British appear to have-overcome
their objections to a justiciable Bill of Rights since nearly all,
the constitutions which the British have imposed on their ex-dependencies in Africa within the past decade have elaborate
Charters of Human Rights.
Furthermae the concept of human rights is by no means alien
to indigenous African legal process. Professor Max Gluckman has
very ably demonstrated 1 that despite occasional aberrations on the
part of a despotic ruler, African legal systems have had an articulate concept of natural justice and legality. The notion of
due process of law permeated indigenous law; deprivation of personal liberty or property was rare; security of the person was
assured-, and customary legal process was characterized not by unpredictable and harsh encroachments upon the individual by the
sovereign, but by meticulous, if cumbersome, procedures for decision-making. The African conception of human rights was an
essential aspect of African humanism sustained by religious doctrine and the principle of accountability to the ancestral spirits.
In.any case indigenous African culture revolved around the family
IGluckman, Natural Justice in Africa, 1964 NATURAL L.F. 25,

or the clan; government by the sovereign was essentially limited.
The concept of accountability of the chief to the people was
well-settled and so there was little opportunity for violation of
human rights.
Violation of community norms invariably led to the
2
chief.
the
of
deposition
Thus, national independence in Africa arrived in an era
replete with concepts of human rights.

In these circumstances

entrenchment of human rights was virtually automatic.

The poli-

tical situation in several African countries also made constitutional guarantee of human rights a political necessity.

For

example, before Nigeria attained independence, the ethnic or
tribal minorities in that country had demanded the creation of
new States to diffuse the power and influence of the dominant
tribes in the three regions of Nigeria.

Since a further division

of Nigeria would have delayed independence it was found necessary
to allay the fears of the minorities by an emphatic"Guarantee of
human rights in the Constitution of 1960. 3

So also in Kenya

where the special status accorded to property rights under the
Kenya Constitution of 1963 reflects the European minority's
concern about the security of their property interests.
The overall effect of the factors mentioned is that human
rights concepts are, with varying degrees of emphasis, embodied
in the constitutions of nearly all the new African nations.

The

human rights provisions of these constitutions follow three main
patterns:
First, the Nigerian type.

The Nigerian Constitution of 1960

contains an elaborate charter of human rights, spelled out in
precise legal terms. 4

The Constitution expressly invests the

courts with jurisdiction to enforce such rights, and defines the
limitations on human rights in specific terms.
2

The Constitutions

M. FORTES & E.EVANS-PRITCHARD, AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

12 (19ol).
See also A.N. ALLOTT, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 69 (1960).
3
See K. EZERA, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NIGERIA (1964).
The Constitution of Nigeria, Articles 18-33.

of Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Sierra Leone follow the Nigerian
pattern. Under these constitutions the people are guaranteed
inter alia the right to life and liberty, respect for private life,
home and correspondence, protection from slavery and forced
labor, protection from inhuman treatment and deprivation of property, the sanctity of the domicile, protection of the law, and
freedom of conscience, of expression, of assembly and association.
Discrimination on any grounds is specifically prohibited.
Second, the Chad pattern. The Preamble of the Constitution of
Chad of 1962 proclaims in general terms its attachment to the principles set forth in the Declaration of Rights of Man of 1789, and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1948. The Preamble then
goes on to guarantee, more specifically, freedom from arbitrary
arrest or detention, inviolability of domicile, prohibition of
oppression by one section of the people or of ethnic propaganda,
freedom of association, petition and expression, freedom of the
press, free education, freedom from distinctions of birth, class
or caste, the right to work, and equality in respect of taxes.
Unlike its Nigerian counterpart, the Chad Constitution does not
spell out the human rights provisions in a special chapter.

The

Preamble guarantees these rights in categorical terms, but in the
form of general directive principles rather than precise legal
rights. The precise limitations of and provision for judicial
enforcement of these rights are presumably reserved for subsequent legislative action. Most of the French-speaking African
countries have adopted substantially similar declarations of human
rights.
Third, the Ghana type. The Republican Constitution of 1960
did not incorporate a Bill of Rights in the usual sense; nor was
any institution set up to protect the rights of the ordinary citizen. The concept of human rights was barely acknowledged in a
provision requiring the President, on the assumption of office, to
declare his adherence to certain fundamental principles among which
were:
That freedom and justice should be honoured and
maintained.

That no person should suffer discrimination-on grounds
of sex, race, tribe, religion or political belief.
That every citizen of Ghana should-receive his fair
share of the produce yielded by the development of the
country.
That subject to such restrictions as may-be necessary
for preserving public order, morality or health, no
person should be deprived of freedom of religion or
speech or of the right to move and assemble without
hindrance or of the right of access to courts of law.
That no person should be deprived of his property save
where the public interest so requires and the law so
provides.5
The contention that this Presidential Declaration was a justiciable
bill of rights was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court of Ghana
in 1961.6

The Supreme Court held that the Presidential declar-

ation was merely the goal to which the President must pledge
himself, comparable to a coronation oath, therefore not a standard which might be invoked to impeach the constitutionality of
the Ghana Preventive Detention Act, 1957.
Article 13 of the Ghana Constitution
Africa.

was unprecedented in

The new government of Ghana which took power in Febru-

ary 1966 suspended the 1960 Constitution.- The Constitutional
Commission recently appointed by the Government of Ghana to make
proposals for a new Constitution emphatically rejected this lukewarm approach to human rights, and recommended the promulgation of
an elaborate Bill of Rights, fully enforceable-in the Courts.
Tanzania's Interim Constitution of 1965 does not include a
Bill of Rights but instead

establishes a novel institution which,

while safeguarding the rights of the ordinary citizen, "will not
have the effect of limiting the actions of the Government and
Party in a way which could hinder the task of nation building."
This institution, called the Permanent Commission of Enquiry
(Interim Constitution, Chapter VI), composed of a Chairman and
two other members, all appointed by the President of Tanzania, is
invested with power to inquire into the conduct of any person in
5
6

Republican Constitution of Ghana Article 13o
Baffuor Osei Akoto v. Minister of Interior [1961] GHANA L.

REP. 523.

the exercise or abuse of his office or authority.

Its jurisdiction

extends to public officers in the service of the United Republic
(except the President and Vice President and the Judiciary),
party functionaries, members and officers of local government
authorities, corporate statutory bodies and non-statutory organizations.7

The Commission reports its findings and recommendations

to the President who may direct appropriate action thereon.

So

this Tanzanian institution really amounts to a variant of the Ombudsman in a one-party state.

It is, in a sense, quite unique

in Africa.
It is evident then that constitutions of the new African
nations north of Rhodesia generally make impressive reading for
the advocate of human rights.

The critical question, though, is

whether adherence to human rights concepts in practice is equally
impressive.
II
PRACTICE
Many incidents on the continent of Africa raise disturbing
questions regarding the human rights record of the new African
States.

To gain a better perspective of this record, we shall

examine some of the more encouraging developments in this area.
First of all,any visitor to black Africa will readily agree that
racial discrimination is largely non-existent.

In striking con-

trast to the situation south of Zambia, men of all races are able
to work together, mix socially and enjoy the resources of their
respective countries without the corroding
tension and mutual
8
distrust which pervade racist societies.

In this respect, the

demands of human dignity as stipulated in the various constitutions have been met.
On the whole, property rights have also been respected in
African States.
7
8

However, attempts in several countries to assure

1nterim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) Act 1965.
R. THURNWALD, BLACK AND WHITE IN EAST AFRICA, passim

(1935).

their citizens effective and meaningful participation in the economic lives of their respective countries have had an adverse
effect on the commercial interests of resident aliens--Africans
and non-Africans alike.

Thus Ghanaian fishermen in Sierra Leone

have been affected by protectionist measures in Sierra Leone;
Nigerian and Lebanese traders have been threatened by new restrictions on alien trading in Ghana; and

Asian non-citizens of Kenya

have felt compelled to leave Kenya because of the measures of the
Kenya Government to bring the bulk of Kenyans into the mainstream
of the commercial life of Kenya. 9

In several African countries

the structure of the economy in the colonial era virtually
excluded Africans from any meaningful role, and Minister Kibaki
of Kenya went to the heart of the problem when in defending the
Kenya Trade Licensing Act, 1967, he said:
The Government fully realizes that the present political stability in the country can only be underpinned
by giving the majority of the people a stake in the
economy....
The Government believes in the Kenyanisation of the
economy because there can be no economic growth without
In many Latin-American countries
economic development.
9

The Kenya Trade Licensing Act, 1967, provides that no person
shall conduct any business, except under and in accordance with the
terms of a current license. A non-citizen is prohibited from conducting business (a) in any place which is not a general business
area; or (b) in a number of specified goods, unless his license
Section 11 of the Act provides that
specifically so authorizes.
in considexing applications for licensing, licensing officers shall:
be guided by the principle that businesses carried on
(a)
in any place which is not within a general business area
ought, where practicable, to be controlled by citizens of
Kenya, and that specified goods-ought, where practicable, to
be dealt in by citizens of Kenya, and in particular take into
consideration-(i) whether the activities in respect of which the license
is applied for ought to be and could be carried on by a
business conducted by citizens of Kenya;
(ii) whether the activity will be in the public interest; and
(iii) any special programme of developmentin the area
concerned.

statistics are bandied about claiming increases in
income per head when there is no noticeable change in the
people's standard of living.
In his Mulungushi Speech of April 1968, President Kaunda of
Zambia announced similar measures designed to curb monopolistic
tendencies in business and to protect Zambian nationals from undue
competitin by aliens.

But it is worthy of note that the President

saw these measures as the imperatives of humanism,

The President

stated:
Humanism abhors the exploitation of human beings.
Exploitation, whether it is done by people of one
racial group against another or done by the same racial group against their own kith and-kin, is wrong.
We will not glorify it in Zambia by allowing it a place. 1 0
The Zambian Government through its Attorney General has made clear
that any discrimination such as in the granting of trading licenses,
in implementing these reforms would be illegal.
The right, if it is not a duty, of a Government of a country
to take appropriate steps to ensure that citizens share effectively
in the economic resources of the country is beyond question.
Thus, although property rights are to some extent abridged, this
is proper when done within the framework and on the basis of justifiable economic reforms implemented with serious efforts to
avoid discriminatory application.
The attitude of African governments to property rights is
best exemplified by their record on nationalization.

Where ex-

propriation has taken place, as in Tanzania, satisfactory arrangements have been made as to compensation for those affected by the
measure. 1 1

In 1962 the Nkrumah Government purchased a mining

interest in Ghana from an English concern on terms which were
12
hailed by financial circles in England of London as exemplary.
One could also cite a number of cases where a confrontation
1 0

Government Printer, Lusaka, Zambia, 1968.
On the Tanzanian nationalization programme see Bradley,
Lgal Aspects of Nationalisation in Tanzania, 3 EAST-AFRICAN L.J.
1919b7).
11

between an African Government and a individual concerning human
of the individual. In the famous
rights has been resolved in favor
. 12
Ugandan case of Uganda v. Mayanja, the judiciary upheld human
rights in unmistakeable terms. Mayanja, a Ugandan politician,
published a letter in the journaf Transition, in which he alleged
that the Uganda Government had been slow in appointing Uganda
Africans to the High Court even though Uganda had a number of
Africans with the requisite qualifications for the Bench, and then
went on to say:
Why don't we take even a first step? I do not believe
the rumour circulating in legal circles for the past
year or so that the Judicial Service Commission has
made a number of recommendations in this direction, but
that the appointments have for one reason or another,
mostly tribal considerations, not been confirmed.
But what IS holding up the appointment of Ugandan
Africans to the High Court?
Mayanja and the editor of Transition were subsequently
charged with sedition on the grounds that the letter carried an
implication that the Government had denied judicial appointment to qualified Africans for reasons of tribal discrimination, and
that this allegation clearly showed a seditions intention, namely,
the intention of "bringing into hatred or contempt, or exciting
disaffection against, the Government as by law established."
Tribal discrimination is the gravest charge that can be leveled
against an African Government which regards itself as progressive,
and the Government's reaction to this letter was to some extent
understandable. Nevertheless, a Magistrate's Court ruled that
the observation in the letter was not seditious; it was a legitimate comment on a matter of public concern which was duly sanctioned
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. It
should however be pointed out that Mayanja and the editor were
13
subsequently detained by the Uganda authorities.
A study of the practice of the Tanzanian Permanent Commission
of Enquiry also reveals several cases where individual rights have
12

Criminal Case No. KNU. 7995 (1968).
13According to a government statement, the grounds of the
detention were unconnected with the publication of the letter in
Transition.

been enforced upon the intervention of the Commission.
ampe, Case No. 1057 reads:

For ex-

The Complainant alleged that a Regional Commissioner
suspended his trading license without any reason.
The Commission took the matter and after an investigation, it was revealed that one day the Regional
Commissioner concerned while visiting certain villages
happened to pass near the shop of the Complainant.
The Regional Commissioner saw a little scuffle occurring
between children of the Shop Keeper (who apparently was
an Asian) and an African. The scuffle was put to an
end and the Regional Commissioner tried to find out the
cause of the fight. The Regional Commissioner alleged
that the Asian boys and their mother answered him rudely
and that they had no reason to beat the African.
Thereupon he ordered that the license be suspended.
The Commission examined the facts as above outlined
and left the Criminalaspect of it aside and dealt with
the point of suspending the trading license. Here the
Commission found that the owner of the license was
not on the spot when the fight occurred and the fight
itself is irrelevant to the trading license, The
Commission reported the matter to the President and the
license was given back to the owner.14
Human rights concepts have provided the yardstick for evaluating the performance of regimes and, ironically, the justification for ousting oppressive governments by violent means.
The military officers who deposed President Nkrumah were clearly
motivated by a passionate attachment to human rights. The present
Chairman of the National Liberation Council, Brigadier A. A.
Afrifa, states his personal credo in these ringing terms:
I am not a lawyer to interpret the provisions of
liberty, freedom, bill of rights, etc. But to me the
concepts are as clear as the Ten Commandments. Among
others are the freedom of worship, of speech and of the
press, the right or peaceable assembly, equality before
the law, just trial for crime, freedom from unreasonable
search, and security from being deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law. Herein are
the invisible sentinels which guard the door of every
home from invasion, coercion, intimidation and fear.
herein is the expression of men who would be forever
free.
Under Kwame Nkrumah these principles were repudiated
every day. Freedom of worship was denied, because he
was held as the incarnation of God, Freedom of speech
was suppressed. The press was censured and distorted
14 [1966-67 Annual Report, Permanent Commission of Enquiry
of Tanzania, Case No. 1057.

with propaganda. The right of criticism was denied.
Men were detained and even sent to the gallows for
holding honest opinions. They could not assemble for
a discussion. We spoke of public affairs only in private. We were subject to searches and seizures by spies
and inquisitors who haunted this land of ours.15
Furthermore in appointing a Commission to draft proposals
for a new Ghana Constitution, the National Liberation Council
specifically charged the Commission to submit such proposals as
would:
(a) ensure the inclusion of the Constitution for Ghana
of a provision which will guarantee that so far as is
consistent with good government, the Executive, Legislative and Judicial powers of the State shall be exercised by three separate and independent organs;
(b) ensure that the said Constitution contains a provision guaranteeing the enjoyment by every individual
in Ghana of the maximum freedom within the law consistent with the rights of others also to enjoy such freedom and consistent also with the security of the State
and with the requirements of public order and morality
with the welfare of the people of Ghana as a whole and
that the said Constitution provides an effective machinery for the protection of such freedom from violation by the State or by any other body or person; and
(c) ensure in particular, under and subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph, that the
said Constitution guarantees the enjoyment by every
individual in Ghana of the following fundamental free-

doms,
(i) freedom of opinion and expression,
(ii) freedom of assembly and association,
(iii)
(iv)

freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, 6and
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.1

Paradoxically, human rights have sometimes been more rigorously enforced under a military regime than under its civilian
predecessor.

This has certainly been the case in Ghana.

Again,

although the Constitution of Dahomey was suspended in December
1965, the Dahomey Minister of Justice could claim, with justification, before a Conference of French-speaking African jurists
in January 1967 that Human Rights were not endangered. Human
rights have been effectively enforced and popularized in that
country, and the distinguished President of the Supreme Court of
15

A.A. AFRIFA, THE GHANA COUP, 24th FEB. 1966 (1967).

1 6Government

Printer, Accra, Ghana 1967.

Dahomey, H. E. Ignatio Pinto, has gained international acclaim
for his resolute championship of

uman

ights.

Thus far this discussion has focused on some of the more
positive developments in the field of human rights within a
decade of African independence.

The progress made by a number of

African countries in this area is comparable with the contemporary
blend of some of the so-called Western democracies.

Nevertheless

an honest appraisal of the African political process in this era
can hardly escape the conclusion that the human rights record in
the emergent African nations still leaves much to be desired.

The

numerous violations of human rights which have characterized
certain regimes in Africa, particularly in the area of personal
liberty are well-known.

We are all familiar with the grim cata-

logue of transgressions -- the capricious use of preventive
detention acts, the proscription of freedom of movement and association, the stifling of free speech, the condemnation of thousands to exile and the tragic destruction of life in the name of
national unity.

Ten years of independence have brought home the

sobering realization that the end of alien rule does not necessarily assure respect for fundamental rights.

A REALISTIC APPRAISAL
We must now examine the causes of this distressing record
and consider the validity of the much canvassed thesis that the
stark realities of nation-building in Africa do not admit of
the luxury of human rights.
A.

Compatibility

of Nation Building and Human Rights

Nation-building in Africa is indeed fraught with formidable
difficulties.

The typical new African state was originally an

artificial creation of the metropolitan power, encompassing a
heterogenous collection of tribes, and representing at best a
colonial administrative or economic convenience.

National boun-

daries are not referable to any criteria other than the accident
of colonial partition.

This means that upon attaining independence,

African governments are confronted with a situation in which the
very existence of their respective nations has yet to be established as a meaningful concept.

Development is further be-

deviled by poverty, disease and illiteracy and a serious dearth
of human and material resources.

On this fragile foundation, the

leaders of an emergent African nation are charged with'accomplishing at least four herculean tasks in their lifetime:

First, to

forge the bonds of unity and nationhood, and to foster wider
loyalities beyond parochial, tribal or regional confines.

Second,

to convert a subsistence economy into a modern cash economy
without unleashing social turbulence and economic chaos.

Third,

to industrialize the country and to introduce a sophisticated
system of agriculture.

Fourth, to erase poverty, disease and

illiteracy, raise the standard of living of the people, and in
short create a modern state with all its paraphanelia. The exPresident of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, proclaimed that he had to
accomplish in ten years what the developed countries had achieved
in a hundred.iT
This unprecedented pace of development and modernization can
only be feasible, if at all, within a stable political framework;
and there can be no political stability without a national political consensus. Most African nations are yet to attain this
consensus; the frequent incidence of coups d'etat graphically
demonstrates the terrible convulsions through which African nations are passing.

Political instability obviously militates

against the establishment of any articulate body of social or
political valuesbut further it undermines the inculcation of
healthy and meaningful human rights traditions.

But political

instability apart, there is no genuine consensus as to the proper
role of a bill of rights in the prevailing conditions of Africa.
Despite the ringing declarations of human rights in African
constitutions the classical concept of fundamental rights has been
17

K. NKRUMAH, DARK DAYS IN GHANA 67 (1968).

attacked by a substantial number of thoughtful Africans as unsuitable for Africa for the following reasons:
First, it is said that the notion of a bill of rights is
essentially a bourgeois concept, rooted in nineteenth century
individualism and best suited to a society with a substantial
degree of economic affluence. The concept of human rights demands limited government;it is laissez faire and negative in
character. But a new African state, confronted with the baffling problems of nation building,the problems of creating political stability, and eradicating disease, poverty and illiteracy, cannot afford the luxury of limited government. Freedom
of speech is meaningless to a people with empty stomachs. The
emphasis should be on strong government, armed with the necessary
powers to perform the urgent tasks of integrating the various
communities in a state into one nation, raising standards of living
and establishing the foundations of a modern state. A bill of
rights, rigidly enforced by a judiciary which looks to precedents
in America and Western Europe for inspiration, would mean the
importation of values and solutions quite inappropriate for a
developing African country, and might well impede not only social and economic progress but also national unity. Those who
attack the use of classical human rights on this theory would
point to the fact that the judiciary in most newly-independent
African countries consists of foreign or foreign-trained personnel,
whose juristic ideas were formed in an atmosphere radically
different from those of new African nations, and who might
therefore be unresponsive to local aspirations. They would cite
the jurisprudence of courts of other countries with respect to
the enforcement of human rights to sustain the assertion that
the judiciary could stand in the way of vital social and economic
reforms. In this regard, much reliance is placed on the record
of the courts of the United States in resisting social legislation as violative of liberty of contract and the due process
clause. The argument's conclusion is that the courts should
not be entrusted with the awesome responsibility of determining

the extent to which individual -rights must give way to the wider
considerations of social progress;that responsibility properly
belongs to political leaders responsible to the electorate.
Second, it is contended that political stability and internal
security in a new African state can only be assured at the
expense of the fundamental liberties of the individual.

Many

African states have at some stage or another, either resorted
to, or seriously considered the introduction of, preventive detention acts on the grounds that the critical formative years of
a new nation demand firm, indeed, stern measures to avert subversion ad political disintegration.

They maintain that freedom

of association cannot be invoked in aid of tribalistic and parochial interests inimical to the preservation of the larger national
entity, nor can freedom of speech be tolerated as a vehicle for
disseminating what they call subversive falsehoods among a
gullible and impressionable public.

In expounding this thesis,

a former Attorney General of Ghana, G. Bing used the following
justification of preventive detention in Southern Rhodesia in 19591
In fairness to the Government it must be conceded
that political subversion, preached and practiced among
illiterate and semi-illiterate African masses can
spread like a forest fire unless subjected to the most
The
strict police and governmental surveillance....
normal trappings of a e democratic judicial system are
deal effectively with such threats to
ill-equippedt
public safetyl
Apologists for authoritarian regimes in Africa have always
castigated the Courts as unequal to the urgent task of containing
civil disruption and suppressing political subversion.

They main-

tain that the rules of evidence and procedure established by the
former metropolitan powers are rigid, cumbersome, and regaled with
archaic technicalities.

Others claim that what makes preventive

detentim indispensable in a developing African state is not so
much the cumbersome nature of "the normal trappings of a democratic judicial system" as the defective methods of the police.
18See G. BING, REAP THE WHIRLWIND 276-77 (1968).

The police cannot be relied upon to marshall the evidence required to sustain indictments for offenses against the state in
the normal judicial process,

Due process of law, it would seem,

might well endanger the security of the state.

This, so the

argument goes, is particularly relevant to the exercise of freedom of the person.In a society where opposition factions are
prone to resort to violence in pursuit of their political goals,
the authorities must mobilize promptly and without ceremony the
D11 panoply of the state's powers and resources'against any potential or, indeed, imagined threat to public safety. Detention,
so the argument goes, without trial is therefore an imperative
postulate of national security and reliance on the normal Judicial process may be fatal.
Third, the question is raised whether every aspect of human
rights need necessarily be accorded equal status in Africa.
Should the classical concepts of property rights, freedom of movement and freedom of association be enforced with the same rigor
as the right to life and immunity from inhuman treatment, slavery
and discrimination? Should not a developing African nation determine its own priorities of political and social values unfrtered by the preferences of the western world?
Finally, it is said that the emphasis on fundamental rights
is misconceived inasmuch as it detracts from the duties which
citizens of a developing country owe to the State and to.their
fellow citizens. The constitutions of Africa should proclaim a
Bill of Duties alongside of a Bill of Rights.

Furthermore, the

constitution should.prescribe the minimum duties of the State,,to
individuals, such as the duty to provide education, health and
similar essential services.

A Bill of Rights merely imposes re-

strictions on the sovereign; what is needed isoa positive indication of the State's role in a developing society.
B.

Problems Faced by African Leaders
These are familiar arguments:

they have been used in defense

of one-party regimes and authoritarian rule in Africa. 1 9
Se___e

e.g., K. NKRUMAH, supra note 17, at 64.

Do they

have any validity?

In answering this question it would be help-

ful to candidly acknowledge some of the difficulties and temptations which face the new leaders of Africa.
1.

Strong Government:

Heritage

African governments inherited essentially authoritarian state
machinery from the colonial powers.

It comes as no surprise

that some of the most repressive measures of the former imperial
authorities were justified on the very grounds on which the new
leaders of Africa seek to base their authoritarian regimes.

Pre-

ventive detention was unabashedly employed in colonial days to
stamp out "tribal conspiracies" and to contain "political agitators."

Illiberal deportation and sedition laws promulgated

by colonial governments provided handy models for their African
successors.

Thus, the Ghana Deportation Act of 1957

which,

inter alia, empowered the Government to deport any alien "whose
presence in Ghana is not conducive to the public good" was defended on the grounds that it represented no departure from preindependence laws.

The melodramatic flight of the Kabaka of Buganda

from his throne in 1966 is reminiscent of his deportation to England
in 1953 by tie British Colonial Governor on the grounds that the
Kabaka had refused to cooperate with the Governor in constitutional
arrangements devised by the Colonial Government.
The Nigerian case of Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Chike Obi 2

0

demonstrates the extent to which legal principles and

traditions well-settled in the colonial era can resist the liberalizing iifuence of a Bill of Rights.

In this case the accused

was charged with sedition under Sections 50 and 51 of the Nigerian Criminal Code 2

1

for publishing a criticism of the Federal

Nigerian Government in the following terms:

"Doim with the ene-

mies of the people, the exploiters of the weak and the oppressors
of the poor."
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Caption 42 of the 1958 Edition of Nigerian Laws.

Section 50 of the Nigerian Criminal Code defines the crime
of sedition, inter alia, as to bring into hatred or contempt or
to excite disaffection against the Government of Nigeria or that
of any region or against the administration of justice in Nigeria.
Section 50 (2) d (ii) of the Code exempts from such crime any
publication with intent "to point out errors or defects in the
Government or Constitution or in legislation or in the administration of justice with a view to remedying such errors or
defects." The accused challenged the constitutionality of Section
50, contending that it was incompatible with Section 25 of the
Nigerian Constitution which guarantees freedom of expression.
However, under Section 25 of the Constitution there is no prohibition of "any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interest of defense, public safety, public
order, public morality or public health."
In attacking Section
50 of the Criminal Code, the accused argued that a law which punthes a person for making a statement which brings a Government into
discredit or ridicule, irrespective of any repercussions on
public order or security, is not reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society.
The accused's submission was in effect an-attempt to import
into the requirements of the crime of sedition the element of incitement to violence which is a salient ingredient of the definition of sedition under English law. The Federal Supreme
Court of Nigeria rejected this contention, holding that it was
justifiabl for a government to take reasonable precautions to
preserve public order, and that such measures might necessitate
the prohibition of acts which, if not restrained, might lead to
disorder even if

these acts would not themselves do so directly.

It is to be noted that unlike its English counterpart, the crime
of sedition is not triable in trial by jury, nor is truth a
defense if the seditious intent is proved.

In

Amalgamated Press (of Nigeria) Ltd. and Fatogun,
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Queen v. The
the funda-

mental right of freedom of expression was held to guarantee
22[1961] All NIGERIA L. REP. 199.

"nothing but ordered freedom."

The Supreme Court ruled that such
right could not be used as a license to spread false news likely
to cause fear and alarm to the public, which constituted an
offence under Section 59(i) of the Criminal Code.
The legacy of the colonial powers is in covenance with the
prevailing political practices in the second half of the 20th
century.

We have to recognize that we live in a world where

strong government is either widely practiced or very much extolled. To many authoritarian rule is synonymous with efficient
government. The concept of strong government has of course been
consummated and perfected in the peoples democracies, but it is
by no means unknown in the so-called Western democracies.

The

British concept of Parliamentary sovereignty- transported into
alien soil, and unrestrained by the inarticulate conventions and
mores which make up the British political genius, could be an
ideal prescription for despotism. A former Cabinet Minister in
Ghana, after the barest acquaintance with British Constitutional
doctrines, proclaimed with all the zeal of a new convert to the
Westminster pattern, that the Ghanaian Parliament could do anything except change a woman into a man!

He could of course have

dropped that qualification, as a matter of strict doctrine.
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France was of
course devised to create a strong government revolving round an
Executive-President, and the concept of a strong ExecutivePresident virtually immune from parliamentary restrictions seems
to have taken firm root in nearly all the former African dependencies of France. It so happens that the Fifth Republic came
into existence immediately before the inauguration of the era of
political independence in French Africa; and the influence of the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic on the Constitutions of French
Africa is very apparent.

Indeed some constitutional theorists

maintain that the Gaullist influence went considerably further;
they assert that the robust presidentialism of the Fifth Republic
had a profound impact on the Constitution of Guinea (1958),
that through its brief union with Ghana, Guinea influenced the

Republican Constitution of Ghana (1960), and that the Ghanaian
Constitution in turn influenced the independence Constitution of
Tanzania.
2.

Strong Government:

A Practical Necessity

Strong government is of course the invariable prescription of
ecoiomic advisers to the new governments of Africa.

Clearly if
economic and social development is to be realized at the pace set
by African leaders, then there is need for vigorous social discipline.

Professor Myrdal

has deplored what he calls the "soft

state" in underdeveloped countries.

He maintains that the various

laws and regulations introduced to establish new economic systems in underdeveloped countries are not being enforced because
the governments have not fully appreciated the need for compulsion
and vigorous discipline in development.
Instead of resorting to compulsion, governments in the newly
independent Asian countries, particularly India, have chosen to
rely on persuasion as the main method of effecting changes in
social and economic patterns. Furthermore, lack of compulsion is
being rationalized as an application of Western democratic principles.
The "soft state," asserts the learned professor will not
insure rapid economic development.
of course.

There is some truth in this,

Any student of industrial relations in Africa will

readily appreciate the dangers inherent in guaranteeing an unqualified right to strike.

In countries where the government

is the largest employer, indiscriminate resort to strike is bound
to jeopardize the execution of rational economic policies.24
Strong government as manifested by the stringent enforcement of laws and regulations or by bold and imaginative direction
in vital economic reforms is of course imperative in the prevailing conditions of Africa.
23

But there are some economic ex-

Myrdal, The "Soft State" in Underdeveloped Countries,

15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1105 (1961T
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24B.C. ROBERTS.& L.G. BELLECOMBE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN

AFRICAN COUNTRIES 64-68 (1967).

perts and prspective foreign investors who go much further;.they
demand "stability," i.e., a guarantee against a change of government for ten years or so, severe curtailment of fundamental libeltes -- no trouble-makers or agitators -- and absolute prohibition
of strikes or other labor pressures. Thus, stability is here
equated with insulation of certain commercial interests from
developments which might prejudice the realization of the profit
targets although the developments may be in the best interests of
the countries involved over the long-term. Unscrupulous businessmen have played a highly pernicious role in underwriting des25
potism and corruption in the new nations of Africa.
The most pressing problem now facing African leaders revolve
around the preservation of the new nations from disintegration
and their security against internal and external subversion.
It is in the protection against the dangers in these critical
areas that the rights of the individual are most likely to be
overridden by the compelling claims of the State.
A new African State has to tackle the fundamental problem of
welding a heterogenous conglomeration of tribes and communities
into a unted nation. The withdrawal of the imperial powers often
means the removal of the only rationale holding a country together,
and the fear of disintegration haunts every African nation.

The

turn of events in the Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda and Ruanda-Urundi
graphically shows that this fear is well-founded. If colonial
powers had some plausible excuses to resort to high-handed measures,
thesituation facing newly-emergent African States bristles with
problems which sometimes defy a tidy distinction between firm
government and despotism. The colonial powers at least accepted
25

The Ollennu Commission Report, Government Printer, Accra,
Ghana (1969), probed into irregularities in the granting of
import licenses to commercial concerns under the Nkrumah Government and revealed that respected western companies had paid
commisstns which were in effect bribes to the governing party,
the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.). The consequence of such
payments is to economically strengthen the government giving it
more power to maintain its grip on the country.

some ground rules for defining their respective spheres of influence on the continent of Africa, and there was little evidence
in the twentieth century of one imperial power encroaching on the
colonial preserve of another. No such ground-rules apply to the
new African States; external powers vie with each other to subvert
these States or establish their influence over them, and this competition does not necessarily follow ideological lines. Subversion from without is often compounded by subversion from within.
Whether out of frustration over the denial of legitimate constitutional processes or impatience with the normal course of such
processes,some opposition groups within some African countries
have resorted to violence as a means of realizing their objectives.
To avert social and political disintegration, many African
governments have resorted to measures which can hardly be reconciled with the classical concept of human rights.

Are these

measures justified? Take, for instance, the laws in several
countries, proscribing regionalist and tribalist propaganda,
or political organization based on tribal, ethnic or religious
affiliation. Thus Article 3 of the Constitution of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (1966) prohibits any regionalist propaganda
liable to endanger the internal security of the State or the integrity of the territory of the Republic.

Article I (8) of the

Constitution of Gabon'(1961) which guarantees freedom of association stipulates the following qualification:
Associations or societies whose aims or activities are
contrary to the penal law and to the good understanding of ethnic groups are forbidden. All acts of racial,
ethnic or religious discrimination, as well as all
regional propaganda which may threaten the internal
security of the*State or the integrity of the Territory
of the Republic, are punishable by law.
Finally there is the Ghanaian Avoidance of Discrimination Act of
1957 which was enacted "to prohibit organizations using or engaging
in tribal, regional, racial or religious propaganda to the detriment of any other community, or securing the election of persons
on accbunt of their tribal, regional or religious affiliation and
for other purposes connected therewith."
The Ghanaian Act made

it a criminal offense for "any organization whose membership is
substantially connected to one community or religious faith to
have as one of its objects the exposure of any other organization
however constituted or of any part of the community, to hatred,
contempt or ridicule on account of their community or religion."
The issue posed by these provisions is a difficult one:

to

what extent can the concept of free association admit of unfettered tribal or religious grouping for political purposes in a
new African nation?

Most progressive Africans would have no

hesitation in subordinating the concept of free associatin to that
of national unity. The term tribalism has of course a perjorative
connotation in comtemporary Africa.

An association, movement or

party composed of people belonging to a political tribe or ethnic
group is presumed to be subversive of national unity. However in
our concern to eliminate divisive forces, we sometimes fail to
realize that a so-called tribalist or separatist movement may be
no more than a protest against denial of effective participation
in the life of the new nation, or what is worse, revulsion against
oppression by an insensitive central authority. As Professor
26
Arthur Lewis has pointed out,
effective participation by all the
diverse communities in the life of the new national entity is the
key to national unity and stability in Africa.

Where such par-

ticipation is denied, or the security of one community is threatened, the most natural form of protest is to cry secession. This
cry comes naturally to a people who saw the first modern political
party organized on national,non-tribal lines barely twenty years
ago.

Before the foundation of the Nkrumah's Convention People's

Party in The Gold Coast (now Ghana), effective political organization throughout Africa found expression almost exclusively
within tribal frontiers.

Apart from such tribal organizations,

there were perfunctory, progressive unions such as Danquah's Gold
Coast Youth Movement, AzikiweIs National Council of Nigeria and
Cameroons and Casely Hayford's West African Congress which
26
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attracted the elite into some sort of faculty lounge discussions,
but had no direct role in shaping political developments.
A little more than twenty years ago, traditional patterns
Political orstill dominated political activity in Africa.
ganization revolved around the village, clan, and the traditional
state, and a so-called tribalist organization now condemned by
progressive Afrians may be the only meaningful-form of political
organization known to the vast majority of Africans. The Action
Group of Western Nigeria grew out of a Yoruba Cultural Group and
would presumably be branded as tribalistic by the progressives these
days. In my opinion the bogey of tribalism should not be invoked
to stifle legitimate political expression; it certainly should not
be invoked to gloss over the fundamental requirement of effective
participation by all grups in the national political process and
the critical problems posed by such-requirement.

Nation-building

is along and painful process; it is a protracted process of accommodation and adjustment. It defies facile generalizations and glib
slogans. In striving towards the goal of national unity, divisive
forces should be discouraged and prohibited outright wherever
feasible. Tribal arrogance and parochial intransigence should
therefore be resisted, and the compelling claims of natiaal
security in the formative stages of nationhood may well justify
some limitations on freedom of association such as the abovementioned provisions of the Constitutions of Congo and Gabon.
But the Ghanaian Avoidance of Discrimination Act went further than
these provisions.
This Ghanaian Act did more than merely ban political
organizations using or engaging in tribal, racial or religious
propaganda to the detriment of any other community; it also forbade the election of persons on account of their tribal or religious affiliation--in my view an unwarrantable fetter on the principle of free elections. Furthermore; the Act prohibited the
exposure of any-organization "however constituted" (it could be
a political party) to ridicule, hatred or contempt by a tribal
or religious organization. Such a provision could be used to
curtail the right to protest the measures of a Government or party

in power, and shows the extent to which the bogey of tribalism
could be invoked to suppress legitimate political activity.
Where the Government pursues policies inimical to the interests
of a particular region or community, and provokes a reaction in
such community or region, can the Government legitimately proscribe organized political activity among the-disgruntled people
on the grounds of national security?
The Ghanaian Avoidance of Discrimination Act of 1957 may
be contrasted with the Political Parties Decree issued by the
Ghana Government on April 28, 1969,which is again designed to
prohibit the formation of political parties on a tribal or religious basis or the use by any political party of names, any words
or symbols intended by such party to arouse tribal or religious
feelings.

The Decree ordains that no party shall be registered

unless at least three founding members of such party are ordinarily resident, or registered as voters, in each of the
regions of Ghana.

It goes on to provide that no more than six

of the founding members of a political party shall belong to any
one tribe,

This measure quite evidently attempts to foster the

organization of political activity on a broader basis and to promote inter-communal harmony.

Unlike the 1957 Act it is not pri-

marily motivated by the desire to punish a particular group stigmatized by the Government as "tribalist. 1

However the question

may be raised as to whether the 1969 Decree is practical.
for example, is a founding member?

What,

And what exactly is meant

by, arousing the tribal or religious feelings of groups?

Are

all tribal or religious feelings suspect and subversive of
natural unity?
IV
AN OVERVIEW
I turn now to the vexed question of the conflict between
the demands of national security and the rights of the individual.
I have already mentioned the potential sources of subversion in a
new African nation.

But the authority of a newly-established

African Government is not only threatened by subversion in the
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sinister sense; it is sometimes undermined by the refusal of
the bulk of citizens to accept the fact that with the end of
colonial rule, ultimate power now resides with-fellow-Africans.
This challenge to governmental authority may take the form of noncooperation, a refusal to accept the verdict of the electorate,
a general state of lawlessness or even an epidemic of crimes. In
its concern to consolidate its authority an African government
may prove incapable of distinguishing between political opposition and subversion against the State.

African leaders are

understandably sensitive to this kind of affront to their authority.

The critical question then is:

to what extent should

individual rights be curtailed in the interests of public safety
and national security in an emergent African nation?

This ques-

tion cannot be answered without reference to the prevailing
social and political conditions in Africa.
It is clearly pertinent to ask whether a particular country
in a particular situation can absorb the strains and stresses of
exuberant enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms.

It seems quite

obvious that the limits of freedom of association and expression,
for example, in a stable democracy are not necessarily coterminous
with those of 4n infant nation, threatened by disintegration and
menaced by subversion. What constitutes an emergency situation
justifying derogation from human rights may vary from country to
country. Many African leaders maintain, with some force, that the
immediate post-independence era is a continuing emergency requiring stringent measures to ensure the public safety. The
problem here is of course the definition of the public interest.
African leaders, particularly in the immediate post independence
period, tend to equate the public interest-with the hegemony of
the ruling party.

Legitimate expose of the Government's short-

comings may be characterized as subversion.

The Nigerian Press

Act of 196427 raises interesting questions as to the definition
of the public interest.

Before the enactment of this Act, the

27See W. SCHIARZ, NIGERIA 126-27 (1968).

Nigerian Press enjoyed a degree of freedom unknown to its counterpart in many African countries.

However this freedom degenerated

into what one knowledgeable author calls "editorial exuberance in
political lies," and the Nigerian Government undoubtedly had
legitimate ground for concern.

To counteract these excesses,

the Act provided:
any person who authorizes for publication, publishes,
reproduces or circulates for sale in a newspaper any
statement, rumour or report, knowing or having reason to believe that such statement, rumour or report is
false, shall be guilty of an offense and liable on
conviction to a fine of L 200 or to imprisonment for
a term of one year.
If the Act had stopped here, there probably would have been
no outcry; but it went further to provide:
It shall be no defense to a charge under this section
that he did not know or did not have reasop to believe
that the statement, rumour or report was false unless
he proves that, prior to publication, he took reasonable
measures to verify the accuracy of such statement,
rumour or report.
The press understandably reacted sharply to the requirement of prior
verification before publication which made newspaper business a
highly hazardous venture.

It should be pointed out that the

Nigerian Government has not made any sinister use of this Act.
In Africa the conflict between the demands of national
security and the claims to individual rights has been most acute
in the area of personal liberty. Detention without due process
of law in the name of national security is a familiar practice
in many African states.

We have discussed above the policy

reasons advanced in support of preventive detention.

However,

experience in several African countries provides ample proof
that high-sounding reasons may be invoked to perpetuate a corrupt,
repressive and irresponsible regime.

Preventive detention, which

has been employed with restraint and good sense in countries like
India, has been indiscriminately used in certain African countries
to victimize political opponents and to terrorize innocent citizens.

In Ghana preventive detention defeated the very objective

it was supposed to achieve; it caused that fatal disaffection which
ultimately led to the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime. Nor can
the policy of repression at that time be credited with the byproduct of accelerated economic development. By stiffling dissent,
curbing iUvidual initiative and so blatantly invading personal
liberty, this policy deprived Ghana of a vital economic resource-qualified personnel. Hundreds of Ghanaian intellectuals and professionals preferred self-exile to Nkrumah's Ghana. Having immunized themselves from that rigourous discipline which a climate
of legality induces, Ghanaian leaders virtually abandoned a rational approach to the problems of development and plunged the
country into economic chaos.
Revulsion against preventive detention in Ghana is now total
and unqualified; the Ghanaian people made this clear in no uncertain terms to members of the constitutional commission who
recently toured the country in connection with the formulation of
proposals for a new constitution.

A preventive detention act is

not likely to be restored to the statute books of Ghana in the
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, a realist cannot entirely rule
out the possibility that preventive detention could, with certain
safeguards notoriously absent under the Ghana Preventive Detention Act of 1957, be a legitimate exercise of state power in
certain situations in any emergent country. Preventive detention
may, in certain circumstances, indeed be unavoidable as a means
of preserving democracy in the formative stages of some emergent
nations, provided it is hedged about with safeguards such as the
following:
(i)

(ii)

Irrespective of the nature of the prejudicial activity
sought to be prevented, all cases of preventive detention
should be referred to an impartial panel, not necessarily
a Court, for review.
Such an impartial panel should be furnished with the
grounds for detention, and the detainee's reply to such
grounds or such other representations as he may make
against the detention. The panel should be empowered to
call for any other information from any governmental or
non-governmental source pertinent to the review of the
case.

(iii)

(iv)
(v)

(vi)

The Preventive Detention Act should make provision for
the release of the detainee if the panel should conclude
that there is no sufficient cause for detention.
The detainee should have a right of oral hearing before
the panel.
Detention should be for a limited period,say for a
maximum of six months, unless the authorities successfully establish that fresh facts implicating the detainee
have arisen.
The ordinary Courts should have jurisdiction to determine
certain formal aspects of the detention; e.g., whether
the detainee comes within the ambit of the act, whether
the alleged prejudicial activity falls within the grounds
for detention specified in the act, whether the detainee's
right of making representations has been derived, and whethe
the authorities continue to detain the detainee notwithstanding a finding by the panel that there is no sufficient
ground for detention.

In evaluating the African record on human rights, one should
not lose sight of the fact that there has been little opportunity
for the classical western concept of human rights to be assimilated into the mores and constitutional conventions of Africans.
Ture, traditional indigenous political systems were predicated
on some notion of a rule of law, but the norms prevailing in
traditional Africa were essentially concerned with regulating
groups--families, clans and the like--and
with ensuring equilibrium of the whole community. The individual had status and security within his immediate group, but it
was unusual for the individual to be involved in a direct confroninteraction between

tation with the sovereign, outside the criminal law. Legality did
not so much involve issues between the individual and the tribe
or state, as issues between various groups in the State. In any
case, whatever may have been the case in small pre-literate
societies, the norms and restrictions established in such societies
are not particularly relevant to the relations between the much
larger and more complex modern African State and its individual
citizens.
Nor did the colonial connection make a profound impression
in this regard beyond exposing Africans to Western literature on
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human rights.

We have seen that colonial governments hardly

applied to their African subjects the principles dictated by
metropolitan liberal traditions.

The gap between the liberal

protestations of imperial governments and the actual rights enjoyed by Africans under colonial rule provided much of the fuel
for the antl-colonial movements in Africa.

It follows then that

the solemn declarations of individual rights to be found in
African constitutions are not restatements of values and principles already embedded in the society, but, at best, a declaration of ideals to aspire to.

Human rights charters are therefore

instruments of education, and performance should be evaluated
in terms of what impact these ideals are making on the thinking
and traditions of the people as a whole, not in terms of how
many strict violations have been committed.

Thus, the dimensions and complexities of the problems relating to the enforcement of human rights in Africa are indeed
formidable.

Nevertheless, this writer cannot subscribe to the

thesis that the present circumstances of Africa render a Bill of
Rights a luxury in the African political system.

The need for

firm and bold leadership in a new African nation is beyond question
and a laissez faire conception of government is quite inappropriate to the stark realities of development needs in Africa.
But strong government, rapid economic development, high standards
of living, and internal security are ideas which are meaningful only insofar as they enrich the lives of individual citizens.
As Aneurin Bevan said:
Not even the apparently enlightened principle of the
'greatest good for the greatest number' can excuse indifference to individual suffering. There is no test
for progress other than its impact on the individual.
If the policies of statesmen, the enactments of legislatures, the impulses of group activity, do not have
for their object the enlargement and cultivation of
individual life, they do not deserve to be called
civilized.28
28
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102
A Bill of Rights proclaims this philosophy in no uncertain
terms; it is a cogent reminder to those temporarily entrusted with
the affairs of the nation that the ultimate objective of state
power is to promote the welfare of the ordinary citizens of the
land.
I reject the notion that human rights concepts are peculiarly
or even essentially bourgeois or Western, and without relevance to
Africans.

Such a notion confuses the articulation of the theo-

retical foundations of Western concepts of human rights with the
ultimate objective of any philosophy-of human rights.

Human

rights, qite simply, are concerned with asserting and protecting
human dignity, and they are ultimately based on a regard for the
intrinsic worth of the individual.

This is an eternal and uni-

versal phenomenon, and is as vital to Nigerians and Malays as
to Englishmen and Americans. I have already indicated that traditional African concepts of humanism unequivocally asserted the
dignity and worth of man.

The problem which faces modern Africa

is not somuch the problem of recognizing the values underpinning
human dignity as the problem of devising effective structures for
asserting and safeguarding human dignity in the larger and more
complex national entities which have recently been established in
Africa.

It may well be that Africans cannot uncritically accept
some of the Western theories of human rights, whether they be

predicated on various concepts of natural law, divine law,
civil contract or nineteenth century individualism.
struggle for human dignity is universal.
the essence of one of the great

But the

This, after all, is

dramas of the twentieth century--

the struggle of the black man for human dignity.
is manifested by three main movements:

This struggle

first, against colonial

domination in black Africa; second, against racial oppression by
the white minority regimes in Southern Africa; and, third,
against racial injustice in America and Europe.
Much has been achieved by these movements, but the struggle
is by no means over.

Political independence has been attained

in black Africa, but this would be meaningless unless political

103
power is used effectively to enrich the life of the ordinary
African and to assure human dignity. Effective participation by
black Americans in the mainstream of the political, social and
economic life of America has not yet been fully realized; and the
movement against racial oppression in Southern Africa has not
yielded any significant results.

While this struggle persists,

it would be tragic to give comfort to the enemies of these movements by misusing political power now available to African leaders
to the detriment of ordinary Africans.

Whether we like it or not,

and however illogical it may appear, the moral force of the Negro
cause in America and South Africa is bound to be undermined by
African inhumanity to the African.
These philosophical underpinnings for some notion of human
rights in Africa are self-evident.

But the case for human rights

in Africa can also be predicated on practical grounds. The limitation on state power implicit in a Bill of Rights need not
necessarily be a fetter upon bold government; it merely asserts
a principle which needs to be reiterated in Africa that a good
government must necessarily be a disciplined government. Such
a rationale is clearly inapplicable to the realities of a developing countxry.

We cannot insist on limited government in

Africa, but we can and must insist on a disciplined and restrained
government, unequivocally committed to the concept of legality.
The short history of independent Africa is replete with the
stories of regimes which, having amassed unlimited powers in the
interest of public welfare, have proceeded to abuse state powers
in furtherance of their personal interests and in cynical disregard of every concept of legality. A discerning observer makes
a telling point:
If the tone of public life is sufficiently honest
and fair-minded, formal norms are relatively unneeded.
That is not the position in Africa; on the contrary,
there is a notable lack of restraints upon the exercise
of state power. This betrays itself most blatantly in
the widespread corruption that seems to exist, especially
in West Africa. When corruption permecltes the entire
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fabric of government, legality is the first sufferer,
for state power is exercised on grounds unrelated to
its nominal purposes. 2 9
Concentration of excessive powers unrestrained by legality
or fidelity to the public interest has not led to prosperity; on
the contrary, governments intoxicated with power have proved
themselves woefully incapable of discipline or rational analysis
of development needs and have consequently
unleashed economic chaos.

The Tanzanian constitutional innova-

tion clearly demonstrates that scrupulous regard for individual
rights is compatible with "strong government."

The exacting

implications of development in Africa indeed demand discipline
both of the governed and the Government; any constitutional devices which underline this need are therefore of critical importance to nation-building in Africa.
If state power is to be subjected to healthy restraints, then
the judiciary has a vital role to play in defining such restraints,
clarifying and enforcing individual rights and in acting as the
final arbiter of the balance between governmental authority and
individual liberties.

True, the judiciary in some African states

may be still predominantly foreign-oriented, but the danger arising
from such a situation can be exaggerated.

With a few notable

exceptions, judges in independent Africa have displayed a genius
30
for adapting themselves to the prevailing political conditions.

They have in the main avoided a head-on collision with the
Executive, and in some cases, have proved themselves fervent
advocates of state powers.

The jurisprudence of African courts

hardly bears out the allegation that judges stand in the way of
social and economic progress.

Furthermore, any obstructive de-

cisions rendered by the Courts can usually be counteracted or at
29
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least neutralized by the rapid turnover of judges; the circumstances of African public life are too fluid to admit of judicial
attitudes crystallizing into an articulate'"philosophy of the
Court."

It is my fervent hope that when such a philosophy does

emerge it will have a distinct libertarian ingredient.

A vigilant

judiciary, deeply committed to the protection of individual rights,
will help to create an atmosphere which compels the Executive to
justify its impositions on the individual.
The next question that arises is whether equal status should
be accorded to all aspects of human rights.

There is a strong

case for devising some sort of hierarchical scheme for human rights
in Africa.

Clearly, the prevailing political philosophy in a

natiofi will determine whether property rights are to be accorded
equal status with the right to life and personal liberty.

In

many African countries, the requirements of development would
appear to justify a less reverent attitude to private property
than is the case in, say, the United States; and the guarantee
of property rights would therefore not be in such quasi-absolute
terms as are applicable to the guarantee of the right to personal
liberty.

Thus, where a government is engaged upon establishing

an equitable economic system, it could, within limits, legitimately
dispose of private property rights in the public interest.

Rights

pertaining to the enjoyment of material resources or participation
in the economic system may vary from country to country; but any
advocate of human rights would assert the right to personal liberty in absolute terms.

Democratic-minded persons may debate

over the merits of free enterprise but not the essential validity
of the right to freedom of conscience or freedom from inhuman
treatment.
Even aspects of personal liberty may be treated differently
iaaccordance with the mores of a particular people.

Thus, while

Section 20(1) of the Nigerian Constitution imposes an absolute
prohibition on slavery, Section 23 qualifies the right to respect private and family life

by sanctioning any law that is
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reasonably justifiable in a democratic society "in the interest
of defence,public safety, public order, public morality, public
health or the economic well-being of the community" or "for the
purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons."
This type of gradation seems quite legitimate, and provides a
means of injecting local considerations into a Bill of Rights.
African countries could also make a distinctive contribution
to human rights concepts by including in a Bill of Rights not only
the classical rights to personal liberty, property, equality,
freedom of expression, association, assembly and movement, but
also rights to some of the more basic requirements of life:
rights to shelter, employment, education and medical services.
These are rights available to ordinary citizens in a welfare
state. The value of such rights in the established democracies
of the western world has been debated over the years. But these
welfare benefits are fundamental and essential prerequisites to
the successful launching of a modern African state and should be
unequivocally guaranteed in the Constititution. These rights
prescribe wholesome objectives of bold and positive government;
they should direct state powers into constructive channels.
Instead of imposing limitations on state power, they provide
legitimate grounds for meaningful state action.
Such an addition would amount to incorporating into a Bill
of Rights the equivalent of "Directive Principles" under the Indian Constitution. These "welfare" rights are not susceptible to
the same enforcement provisions as are applicable to the classical
human rights, since it may be difficult to define, in precise
terms, the full implications of, say, the right to shelter.
NeverthEess, they should be unequivocally guaranteed in the Constitution in the same way as'the classical rights are *guaran-"
teed under the Constitutions of'the French-speaking African
countries. They would require further elaboration, but should
provide guidelines for social and economic legislation.

CONCLUSION
Whatever may be the philosophical basis of western concepts
of human rights, some scheme of human rights appropriately modified to respond to the demands of nation-building has unquestionable
validity in contemporary Africa.

Such a scheme is as important

to Africa as raising the standard of living of the population; and
nationalism would indeed be playing a perverse role in Africa if
it led to the dismissal of any theory of human rights as alien
to the African way of life.

Human rights concepts revolve around

the fundamental values postulated by human dignity, and these
values have as much meaning for an American Negro, a Kenyan or
a Ghananian as they have for a Frenchman or a Pole.

The particular

circumstances of a deiveloping African country may dictate
varying methods of attaining these values and, indeed, some departues from classical western models, but they cannot diminish
the fundamental truth that an African is equally entitled to human
dignity.

